Abstract“NOISE” is a term we are using to describe a complex and distressing aspect of the bodily and cognitive experience of many very ill psychiatric patients. By “noise,” we mean an internally experienced state of crowding and confusion created by a variety of stimuli, the quantity, intensity and unpredictability of which make it difficult for individuals so afflicted to tolerate and organize their experience. Attempts to do so may only add to confusion and psychotic phenomena.

This book examines Aristotle's critical reaction to the mathematical cosmology of Plato's Academy, and traces the aporetic method by which he developed his own ...

Cleary discusses the origin, development, and use of the many senses of priority as a central thesis in Aristotle’s metaphysics. Cleary contends that one of the most revealing problems for the ambiguity of Aristotle’s relationship to Platonism is that of the ontological status of mathematical objects. In support of his claim, Cleary analyzes a curious passage from Aristotle’s _Topics, _where he appears to accept a schema of priorities that makes mathematical entities more substantial than sensible things. How does Aristotle try (...) to reconcile the ordering of things dictated by sciences like mathematics and dialectic with the ordering of sense experience upon which his own physics and metaphysics are based? To find the answer, Cleary reviews three different outlines of the many senses of priority given by Aristotle himself and found in _Categories _12-13, _Metaphysics _Delta 11, and _Metaphysics _Theta 8. Cleary suggests there is an implicit hierarchy for Aristotle that leads him to posit the Prime Mover at its apex as complete actuality and, therefore, as the focus for the concept of priority. Having reviewed Aristotle’s treatment of the many uses of priority, Cleary demonstrates how the concept is used in some typical arguments by Aristotle for his mature metaphysical positions. (shrink)

Interest in thought experiments (TEs) derives from the paradox: “How can findings that carry conviction result from a new experiment conducted entirely within the head?” Historical studies have established the importance of TEs in science but have proposed disparate hypotheses concerning the source of knowledge in TEs, ranging from empiricist to rationalist accounts. This article analyzes TEs in think‐aloud protocols of scientifically trained experts to examine more fine‐grained information about their use. Some TEs appear powerful enough to discredit an existing (...) theory—a disconfirmatory purpose. In addition, confirmatory and generative purposes were identified for other TEs. One can also use details in transcript data, including imagery reports and gestures, to provide evidence for a central role played by imagistic simulations in many TEs, and to suggest that these simulations can generate new knowledge using several sources, including the “extended application” of perceptual motor schemas, implicit prior knowledge, and spatial reasoning operations, in contrast to formal arguments. These sources suggest what it means for TEs to be grounded in embodied processes that can begin to explain the paradox above. This leads to a rationalistic view of TEs as using productive internal reasoning, but the view also acknowledges the historical role that experience with the world can play in forming certain schemas used in TEs. Understanding such processes could help provide a foundation for developing a larger model of scientific investigation processes grounded on imagistic simulation (Clement, 2008). (shrink)

... Dans le De principiis d'Origene, le chapitre 9 du tome II concerne le debut de la creation du monde, c'est-a-dire, selon la perspective de 1'auteur, ...

MODERN ARISTOTELIAN SCHOLARSHIP is heavily indebted to the German scholars of the nineteenth century who produced the Berlin Academy editions of Aristotle's corpus and of his Greek commentators. The foundations for this massive project were laid around the middle of the century by people like Schwegler, who edited and commented on Aristotle's Metaphysics. Yet, while acknowledging our debt to such exemplary scholarship, I want to cast doubt on one of his proposed emendations to Metaphysics 6.1, which influenced later editors like (...) W. D. Ross and Werner Jaeger. (shrink)

A CONCERN TO UNDERSTAND THE POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITS of human freedom is as old as philosophy. Yet the question whether and in what sense human beings are free agents still provokes heated debate. Even a century ago, as William James began his discussion of the issue, he wondered, with some bemusement, whether there could possibly be any “juice” left in it! Happily, he concluded that there was still more to be said, but his eloquent defense of free will failed to (...) convince; it became just another chapter in the ongoing and seemingly endless dispute. In the years since, many additional essays and books have been written, covering every aspect and espousing every possible view of the matter. The deep disagreements continue. It is this very phenomenon, the remarkable persistence—and resistance—of the problem of freedom, upon which I wish to reflect. Why is it that after such a long history the same vigorous differences endure? Is it more than mere philosophical partisanship that keeps the discussants talking past one another? I believe that there is more to it. I suspect, much as Kant thought, that there is here a sort of antinomy in which valid but seemingly incompatible intuitions are expressed over and over again. Perhaps by considering this possibility we can, even now, squeeze out a bit more juice. (shrink)

Despite Platonism's unquestioned claim to being one of the most influential movements in the history of philosophy, for a long time the conventional wisdom was that Platonists of late antiquity, or Neoplatonists, were so focused on otherworldly metaphysics that they simply neglected any serious study of the sensible world, which after all is 'merely' an image of the intelligible world. Only recently has this conventional wisdom begun to be dispelled. In fact, it is precisely because these thinkers did see the (...) sensible world as an image of the intelligible world that they devoted so much time and energy to understanding its inner workings. Thus we find Neoplatonists writing on embryology, physiology, meteorology, and astronomy, among other subjects.Neoplatonism and the Philosophy of Nature collects essays by leading international scholars in the field which shed new light on how the Neoplatonists sought to understand and explain nature and natural phenomena. It is thematically divided into two parts, with the first part--The General Metaphysics of Nature--directed at the explication of central Neoplatonic metaphysical doctrines and their relation to the natural world, and the second part--Platonic Approaches to Individual Sciences--showing how these same doctrines play out in individual natural sciences such as elemental physics, geography, and biology. Together these essays show that a serious examination of Neoplatonic natural philosophy has far-reaching consequences for our general understanding of the metaphysics of Platonism as well as for our evaluation of their place in the history of science. (shrink)

PHILOSOPHY of nature is not currently considered standard fare in philosophy. Rather than the title of an area of inquiry, it has become the name of an isolated historical phenomenon—the Naturphilosophie of Schelling, Goethe, and Hegel, or a label for some school doctrine—the continuing tradition built upon the first books of Aristotle’s Physics or the newer one rooted in Whitehead’s Process and Reality. Philosophers do not typically see these systems of thought in terms of a common problematic, certainly not one (...) which is presently viable or important. (shrink)

This volume contains papers originally presented to the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy during 2005-6. Of the seven colloquia, two deal with topics in Neoplatonism, four are dedicated to Aristotle’s ethics and metaphysics, and one to Plato’s Republic.

In this paper the author discusses the complex question of whether Proclus regards theology as a demonstrative science along the lines of Euclidean geometry, or as a different kind of science that follows the dialectical model of Plato's Parmenides. This question is focused by considering the applicability to the Elements of Theology of the Euclidean model of science, while examining the limitations of this hermeneutical approach.

I examine one aspect of the central role which mathematics plays in Proclus's ontology and epistemology, with particular reference to his Elements of Theology. I focus on his peculiar views about the ontological status of mathematical objects and the special faculties of the soul that are involved in understanding them. If they are merely abstract objects that are "stripped away" from sensible things, then they are unlikely to reorient the mind towards the intelligible realm, as envisioned by Plato in the (...) Republic. Thus, in order to defend the function of mathematics as a prodaideutic to dialectic, Proclus rejects Aristotelian abstractionism in favor of an elaborate account in terms of Nous projecting images of its Forms through the medium of the imagination. In metaphorical terms, he replaces the Aristotelian image of the soul as a blank tablet with that of a tablet that has always been inscribed and is always writing itself, while also being written on by Nous. The mediating function of mathematics for understanding the higher realities is grounded in the fact that its central principles of Limit and Unlimited have a universal provenance in Proclus's whole system of reality. (shrink)

In the first part of this paper, it is argued that Popper's understanding of Plato's notion of freedom is fundamentally flawed because he begins with the unexamined assumptions of modern liberalism. Subsequently, in the second section, it is shown through philological analysis that the ancient notion of freedom must be understood primarily in terms of a social and political condition that is the opposite of slavery or of living under a tyranny. Finally, the third section of the paper considers Plato's (...) criticism of the demotic notion of freedom, as well as the dialectical strategy through which he subsumes it under his aristocratic ideal of freedom as rational self-control. (shrink)

In the first part of this paper, it is argued that Popper’s understanding of Plato’s notion of freedom is fundamentally flawed because he begins with the unexamined assumptions of modern liberalism. Subsequently, in the second section, it is shown through philological analysis that the ancient notion of freedom must be understood primarily in terms of a social and political condition that is the opposite of slavery or of living under a tyranny. Finally, the third section of the paper considers Plato’s (...) criticism of the demotic notion of freedom, as well as the dialectical strategy through which he subsumes it under his aristocratic ideal of freedom as rational self-control. (shrink)

With one exception, the papers in this volume were originally presented to the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy during 2006-7. Five colloquia deal directly with Plato, while another discusses Heidegger's interpretation of Plato. Two colloquia deal with the Epicurean notion of preconception and with the Stoic conception of the good.

This volume contains papers and commentaries originally presented to the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy during the 2004-5 academic year. Of the seven colloquia in the volume, two deal with Plato while the rest are dedicated to Aristotle.